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I. INTRODUCTION

A. Legislative History
Money laundering has been characterized as the "lifeblood" of international narcotics trafficking and traditional organized crime.' The Money
Laundering Control Act ("MLCA") of 1986 makes it a federal crime to
launder proceeds from specified unlawful activity. 2 In enacting federal

* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. The author served as Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Justice Programs in the U.S. Department of Justice during the Bush
Administration. He also worked as a federal prosecutor from 1985 to 1989.
The author would like to thank Elizabeth Baird and Jennifer Whitacre for their research assistance
and invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article. I would also like to extend my appreciation
to Melissa Brown for her diligent editorial assistance.
1. See 132 CONG. REC. 18,486-18,487 (1986) (statements of Senators Thurmond and Hatch);
PRESIDENT'S

COMMISSION ON

ORGANIZED

CRIME, THE

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING

CASH

CONNECTION:

4-8 (1984) [hereinafter

ORGANIZED

CRIME,

THE CASH CONNECTION];

United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 43 (2d Cir. 1993).
2. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-57 (1988)).

AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:823

legislation criminalizing the laundering of illicit proceeds, Congress was
responding to the spiraling growth and pervasiveness of money laundering in
the United States and the nexus between money laundering and organized
crime.3 Congress's primary intent was to criminalize the "process by which
one conceals the existence, illegal source, or illegal application of income,
and then disguises that income to make it appear legitimate." 4 The MLCA
also aimed to stem the flow of illicit profits back to the criminal enterprise,
where profits provide the capital needed to expand criminal activity.5
3. The revenues generated from drug trafficking alone have been estimated annually at over $300
billion worldwide, $100 billion of which is from trafficking in the United States. Carl P. Florez &
Bernadette Boyce, Laundering Drug Money, FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Apr. 1990, at 22-23. To put
this in perspective, the Department of Justice observed that this figure represents approximately two
percent of the gross national product and is larger than the entire U.S. automobile market. Emily J.
Lawrence, Note, Let The Seller Beware: Money Laundering, Merchantsand 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957, 33
B.C. L. REV. 841, 841 n.2 (1992); see also House Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
Comprehensive Money LaunderingPreventionAct, H.R. REP. No. 746, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1986):
[T]here is more money being laundered than ever before, involving more people, and
the schemes to wash dirty money are now often so sophisticated that it is not unusual to
find an intricate web of domestic and foreign bank accounts, dummy corporations and
other business entities through which funds are moved, almost instantaneously, by
means of electronic transfers.
4. THE CASH CONNECTION, supra note 1, at 4. In July 1983, the President established the
Commission on Organized Crime, charging it with submitting recommendations to the President on
legislative changes to combat organized crime and improve the administration of justice. In October
1984, the Commission issued an interim report entitled, THE CASH CONNECTION: ORGANIZED CRIME,
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND MONEY LAUNDERING. The report contained legislative proposals to
stem the flow of illicit money back to drug suppliers and other organized criminals. See United States
v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1474-77 (10th Cir. 1994) (explaining that the statute prohibits
activities designed to further a "launderer's goal of 'plac[ing] illicit bulk cash in an economy [so] it
becomes increasingly difficult to uncover their money laundering operation' ") (citations omitted).
5. Senator D'Amato, a chief sponsor of the Senate Bill, posited:
Money laundering permits the drug traffickers to evade taxes and to conduct their
operations and finance their drug networks behind a veil of secrecy. It allows them to
buy more drugs for resale, and to acquire the planes, boats, and front corporations they
use to smuggle drugs into the United States.
Drug Money Laundering: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985) [hereinafter Drug Money Laundering Hearing];see also, e.g., International Narcotics and Control Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-583, 106 Stat. 4914 (1992) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 635, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151, 2291 (Supp. V 1993)).
Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, upon introduction of the Senate Bill, emphasized:
Money laundering is a crucial financial underpinningof organized crime and narcotics
trafficking. Without money laundering, drug traffickers would literally drown in cash.
Drug traffickers need money laundering to conceal the billions of dollars in cash
generated annually in drug sales and to convert his [sic] cash into manageable form.
Regrettably, every dollar laundered means another dollar available to support new
supplies of cocaine and heroin on the streets of this country.
S. REP. No. 433, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986). Senator Dennis DeConcini remarked that "[wlithout
the means to launder money, thereby making cash generated by a criminal enterprise appear to come
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Additionally, the enormous profits generated by organized crime and the
drug cartels have created, out of necessity, a new profession within criminal
circles-the professional money launderer.6 Congress was concerned with
the increasing number of professionals, such as lawyers, accountants and
bankers, who were either willing to look the other way or to become active
participants in the laundering of illicit monies.7 Congressman Shaw, one of
the sponsors of the House Bill, declared, "I am sick and tired of watching
people sit back and say, 'I am not part of the problem, I am not committing
the crime, and, therefore, my hands are clean even though I know the money
is dirty I am handling.' "8According to one commentator, the MLCA was
intended to put a stop to the activities of both those who make, and those who
take, dirty money.9
Finally, Congress intended the MLCA to address the so-called "structuring" loophole problem. Prior to the enactment of the MLCA, the Bank
Secrecy Act of 1970 ("BSA") required financial institutions to file a Currency
Transaction Report ("CTR") with the Department of Treasury for currency
transactions in excess of $10,000.0 To avoid the reporting requirements of
the BSA, a single currency transaction would often be structured into
multiple transactions of less than $10,000 each. Individuals known as "smurfs"
provided the structuring service by engaging in multiple banking transactions
of less than $10,000. Since none of the transactions exceeded $10,000, no
CTR would be filed." Moreover, courts specifically held that the BSA did not
from a legitimate source, organized crime could not flourish as it now does." Money Laundering:
Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1985).
6. H.R. REP. No. 746, supra note 3, at 16. In a hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, the United States Treasury Department provided figures highlighting
the success of the Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement (OCDE) task forces in dismantling 18
major money laundering organizations. The Treasury Department provided a breakdown revealing
that the 18 criminal organizations laundered approximately $2,793,000,000. Drug Money Laundering
Hearing,supra note 5, at 13-14. A federal investigation of the Orozco organization helped dismantle a
money laundering operation that had laundered in excess of $151 million during a 13-month period.
Id. In the so-called "Pizza Connection" investigation, the Treasury Department reported that over a
five-year period this organization distributed $1.65 billion worth of heroin and laundered at least $28
million in heroin proceeds in a 33-month period. Id. These astounding figures underscore the
enormous wealth generated by the narcotics trade.
7. Senator Sasser commented that "it's no secret that for some banks, paying the $10,000 fine [for
failure to file a report under the Bank Secrecy Act] or the risk of paying it is really a small price to pay
for the large cash deposits that may find their way into the vaults of these particular banks." The Drug
Money Seizure Act and The Bank Secrecy Act Amendments: Hearing Before The Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing,and UrbanAffairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1986).
8. Markup by the Subcommittee on Crime of H.R. 5077, Money Laundering Control Act of 1986,
Transcript, pp. 22-23, quoted in The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, H.R. REP. No. 855, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986).
9. Lawrence, supra note 3, at 849.
10. Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1118
(1970) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 321, 5311-5314, 5316-5322 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
11. The MLCA closed the structuring loophole by enacting 31 U.S.C. § 5324, known as the
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prohibit such "structuring" of transactions to avoid the CTR filing requirement.1 2 In short, by enacting the MLCA, " 'Congress intended simply to add
a new criminal offense to punish activity that was not previously punished

criminally.' ""
B. The Statutory Scheme
The MLCA makes it a crime to knowingly engage in a financial transaction
with the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity either with the intent to
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity (18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)), or with the design of concealing the nature, location,
source, ownership, or control of the illicit proceeds (18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)) 4 Sections 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) are aimed
"anti-smurfing statute." The statute provides:
No person shall for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section
5313(a) ...with respect to such transaction(1) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to fail to file a report
required under section 5313(a)... ;
(2) cause or attempt to cause a domestic financial institution to file a report
required under 5313(a) ...that contains a material omission or misstatement of
fact; or
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions ....
31 U.S.C. § 5324 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
12. See United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1309 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1004 (1989);
United States v. Mastronardo, 849 F.2d 799, 804 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621,
625-26 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Varbel, 780 F.2d 758, 762 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Denemark, 779 F.2d 1559, 1562-69
(11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676, 681 (1st Cir. 1985).
13. United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1244 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Edgmon,
952 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3037 (1992)).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (a)(1) provides in relevant part:
(a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a
financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity(A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) with intent to ...[violate] section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986; or
(B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part(i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership,
or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity; or
(ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement ....
For cases setting forth the elements of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), see Garcia-Emanuel,14 F.3d at 1473;
United States v. Baker, 985 F.2d 1248, 1252 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 682 (1994); United
States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 766 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Levine, 970 F.2d 681, 686 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 289 (1992). The requisite elements to support a conviction under
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) are detailed in United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 680 (2d Cir. 1994); United
States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 937 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1360
(5th Cir.), cert denied, Gregg v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2119 (1994); United States v. Paramo, 998
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at different activities, "the first at the practice of plowing back proceeds of
'specified unlawful activity' to promote that activity [the "promotion" provision], the second at hiding the proceeds of the activity [the "concealment"
provision]."' 5 Section 1956(c)(7) defines the term "specified unlawful activ16
ity" as encompassing a broad array of statutorily designated felony offenses.
17
As defined in the statute, "specified unlawful activity" includes bank fraud,
illegal gambling business and interstate transmission of wagering information, i mail fraud,19 violation of the Hobbs Act,2 ° and narcotics trafficking.21
The MLCA also prohibits international money laundering. Section
1956(a)(2) proscribes the transportation or transfer of monetary instruments
or funds internationally with the intent to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity, or knowing that the monetary instruments or
funds represent the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, with the
design to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of the illicit proceeds.22 Section 1956(a)(2) is" 'designed to illegalize
international money laundering transactions,' and 'covers situations in which
money is being laundered. .. by transferring it outside the United States.' ,23
F.2d 1212, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1076 (1994); United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d

1377, 1387 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 1991).
15. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531,
535 (6th Cir. 1993) ("A central focus of subsection (a)(1)(B)(i) is to ciminalize the 'conversion of cash into goods
and services as a way of concealing or disguising the wellspring of cash.' ") (quoting Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840).
16. Section 1956(c)(7)(A) defines a specified unlawful activity as any act that would constitute
"racketeering activity" under the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Section
1961(1), in turn, designates numerous felony offenses that would support a finding that the defendant
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. Section 1956(c)(7)(D) details other federal felony
offenses that constitute specified unlawful activity.
17. See Piervinanzi,23 F.3d at 679.
18. See United States v. LeBlanc, 24 F.3d 340, 346 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Miller, 22 F.3d
1075, 1077 (11th Cir. 1994).
19. See United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90 (5th Cir. 1994); Paramo, 998 F.2d at 1216-18.
20. See Montoya, 945 F.2d at 1076.
21. See United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1206 (3d Cir. 1994); Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2); see Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6471(b), 102
Stat. 4181, 4378 (1988); see also Carr, 25 F.3d at 1206; Piervinanzi,23 F.3d at 678-80; United States v.
Monroe, 943 F.2d 1007, 1015 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1585 (1992); United States v. Lee,
937 F.2d 1388, 1396 (9th Cir. 1991), cer. denied, 112 S. Ct. 977 (1992).
23. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d at 680 (quoting S. REP. No. 433, supra note 5, at 11). See Samour, 9 F.3d at
536 ("In subsection (a)(2), Congress outlawed the physical transportation or wire transfer of tainted
funds across United States borders.").
In 1988 Congress amended the MLCA, adding a "sting" provision. Section 1956(a)(3) prohibits
engaging in a financial transaction in which a law enforcement officer represents property to be the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity. The "sting" provision requires that the defendant engage in
the financial transaction with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, or to
conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the property. The enactment
of the "sting" provision was intended to negate an impossibility defense where a law enforcement
officer, acting undercover, poses as a drug dealer and the defendant agrees to launder the purported
drug proceeds. See United States v. Perez, 992 F.2d 298 (11th Cir. 1993).
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C. The Statutory Construction Dilemma
Applying the MLCA has confounded the courts. The federal circuits are
divided on two issues: (1) whether the payment for drugs with the proceeds of
drug sales violates section 1956(a)(1); and (2) whether the receipt and
transportation of drug proceeds by the drug seller (or drug money courier
acting on his behalf) violates section 1956(a)(1). Specifically, the circuits have
split over whether the payment of monies for drugs or the transportation of
drug proceeds constitutes a "financial transaction" as defined under section
1956(c)(3). 24 This division has resulted in the inconsistent application of the
money laundering statute, with some circuits affirming a money laundering
conviction, and others overturning a factually similar drug-related conviction.
Equally troublesome is whether payment for illegal drugs with funds
derived from drug sales satisfies the additional statutory requirement that the
defendant conduct the financial transaction either "with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity," or "knowing that the
location, [or]
transaction is designed ...to conceal or disguise the nature, the
25
the source ... of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.",

The government has aggravated the problem by its sometimes erratic and
incongruous filing of charges under the MLCA. In certain cases, federal
prosecutors have charged the defendant with a violation of section
1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (the "promotion" provision) under the theory that the
payment of monies for drugs promoted the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity. 26 In other factually comparable cases, the government has charged
the defendant with a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (the "concealment" provision), maintaining instead that the payment for drugs was
intended to conceal the source or nature of the drug proceeds. 27 The courts
have consistently held that neither the exchange of money for drugs, nor the
transportation of the proceeds of drug sales, by itself, constitutes a violation
of section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 28 The circuits, however, have inconsistently
construed the MLCA in deciding whether this same drug-related activity is
proscribed by section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
24. See United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1994) (movement of drug proceeds
may constitute "transaction"); United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 939 (5th Cir. 1994)
(existence of "financial transaction" depends upon whether the evidence supports a finding of
"disposition," i.e., that the drug money was given over to the care or possession of another); Samour, 9
F.3d at 536 (merely transporting cash does not constitute "financial transaction").
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), (a)(1)(B)(i).
26. See United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1994); Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d at 929; United
States v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.
1991).
27. See United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1994); Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1239; Samour, 9 F.3d
at 531; United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1992).
28. See Skinner, 946 F.2d at 177-78; Hamilton, 931 F.2d at 1051-52.
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Two circuits, the Second and Fifth, have concluded that the payment of
money for drugs promotes the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, and
have sustained money laundering convictions under section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).29
In each of these cases, the legal analysis in support of the court's conclusion
was minimal, at best. Moreover, the Second Circuit completely misconstrued
Congress's intent in enacting the MLCA.3 °
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit held that the wire transfer of money as
payment for drugs received on consignment did not promote unlawful
activity within the meaning of the statute. 3 ' Likewise, the Sixth Circuit, in
overturning a money laundering conviction, ruled that the mere transportation of narcotics proceeds does not violate section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 32 The
Fifth Circuit, on similar facts, reached the opposite conclusion.33
In attempting to resolve the issue of whether exchanging money for drugs,
or merely transporting drug proceeds, is proscribed conduct under the
MLCA, most courts have engaged in a strict construction of the statutory
elements. These courts place their emphasis on whether the defendant
engaged in a "financial transaction," and if so, whether the defendant had
the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, or had
knowledge that the transaction was designed to conceal or disguise the
nature or source of the illicit proceeds.
The Tenth and Fourth Circuits, by contrast, have looked primarily to
legislative intent. The Tenth Circuit has posited that Congress intended to
criminalize conduct that "follows in time" the underlying crime that generated the funds to be laundered, rather than merely affording an alternative
means of punishing the prior "specified unlawful activity. ,34 In order to
sustain a conviction under section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the Tenth Circuit has
required more proof than merely that the financial transaction promoted the
commission of the underlying offense. The Tenth Circuit would require proof
that the defendant took the additional step of attempting to legitimize the
proceeds to make it appear that the funds were derived from legal enterprises.35
In construing section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (the "promotion" provision), the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that Congress intended money laundering activity
and the "specified unlawful activity" to be separate offenses which are
29. See Skinner, 946 F.2d at 177-78; Hamilton, 931 F.2d at 1051-52.
30. See Skinner, 946 F.2d at 177-78 (reading statutory language to show that Congress "sought to
reach conduct that went beyond the concealment of proceeds of criminal activity" and "to make
unlawful a broad array of transactions designed to facilitate numerous federal crimes").
31. Heaps, 39 F.3d at 486.
32. Samour, 9 F.3d at 536.

33. See United States v. Gallo, 927 F.2d 815, 822 (5th Cir. 1991).
34. See Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1214; see also Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1246.
35. Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1247.
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separately punishable.36 That court has held that "[t]he statute should not be
interpreted to make any drug transaction a money laundering crime." 37
The thesis of this article is that in enacting the MLCA, Congress intended
to punish criminal activity not otherwise proscribed by federal law. Moreover, the payment for drugs with money derived from illegal narcotics sales,
as well as the transportation of drug proceeds, falls within the meaning of the
term "financial transaction" as defined in subsections 1956(c)(3) and (4).
However, neither the payment for drugs with the proceeds of drug sales, nor
the mere transportation of narcotics proceeds, without more, is prohibited
conduct under section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Finally, mere payment made by the
purchaser to the seller of the drugs with money derived from drug sales, as
well as the receipt and delivery of drug proceeds, is insufficient to sustain a
conviction for a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), absent evidence that
the proceeds of specified unlawful activity were being plowed back to
promote the carrying on of the drug distribution business.38
Part I1 of this article will analyze how the federal circuits have inconsistently and, in some cases, erroneously construed the term "financial transaction." Part III will examine section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and explain why neither
the payment for drugs nor the transportation of drug proceeds constitutes a
violation of this section. Part IV will examine section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), and
discuss whether the promotion of the above-described drug-related activity,
executed either domestically or internationally, is proscribed conduct under
this provision of the MLCA. Additionally, Part IV will examine whether the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity must be plowed back to promote the
continuation of that activity in order to support a violation of the statute.
II. SATISFYING THE "FINANCIAL TRANSACTION" REQUIREMENT

To sustain a conviction under either section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) or (a)(1)(B)(i),
the government must prove that the defendant engaged in a "financial
transaction" with the requisite intent. "Transaction" is broadly defined in
section 1956(c)(3) to include "purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer,

36. Heaps, 39 F.3d at 486 ("Congress intended to prevent an ill other than those already prohibited
by other laws.").
37. Id. at 486.
38. For example, if the drug buyer took funds derived from the sale of narcotics and made payment
to the drug supplier to pay off an outstanding drug debt (drugs received on consignment), but with no
intention of continuing to distribute drugs in the future, this conduct would not support a violation of
section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). On the other hand, if the drug purchaser made the payment to ensure a
continuous source of supply for drug distribution in the future, i.e., the drug supplier refused to sell
the defendant any more drugs until he paid off his outstanding drug debt, this would constitute
plowing back illicit proceeds to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, and would
sustain a violation of the statute.
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delivery, or other disposition ....
."'
With respect to a financial institution,
the term transaction includes "a deposit, withdrawal, transfer between
accounts, exchange of currency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of
any stock, bond, certificate of deposit, or other monetary instrument, or any
other payment, transfer, or delivery
by, through, or to a financial institution
40
effected.",
means
by whatever
"Financial transaction" is defined in section 1956(c)(4). It involves the
movement of funds by wire or other means which in any way or degree affects
interstate or foreign commerce.4 1 In the statutory definition, section 1956(c)(4)
lists many different types of financial transactions, including the purchase,
42
sale, or disposition of real property, vessels, aircraft, and automobiles.
Whether the mere transportation of illicit narcotics proceeds constitutes a
financial transaction has divided the circuits. In United States v. Samour,4 3 the
defendant was convicted at trial of four counts of money laundering for
transporting successive payments of $20,000, $68,000, $70,000, and $20,000
from Ohio to Arizona to purchase quantities of marijuana.' The Sixth
Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the transportation of drug
proceeds did not constitute a "financial transaction" under the statute.45
The Samour court framed the issue in the case as "whether transporting
money concealed either in an automobile or on one's person is a 'financial
transaction' "under the MLCA.46 The court, however, proceeded to answer
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) (1988). See United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239,1246 (10th Cir. 1994)
("Subsection 1956(c)(3) defines 'transaction' to include 'delivery' of the illegal proceeds."); United
States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 1991).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3).
41. Section 1956(c)(4) provides in relevant part:
(c) As used in this section(4) the term "financial transaction" means (A) a transaction which in any way or
degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving the movement of funds
by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more monetary instruments, or (iii)
involving the transfer of title to any real property, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, or
(B) a transaction involving the use of a financial institution which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce in any way or
degree ....
42. Id.; see also United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1993) (discussing the statutory
construction of the terms transaction and financial transaction); United States v. Turner, 975 F.2d
490, 497 (8th Cir. 1992) (conviction for money laundering affirmed where evidence showed that
defendant was a drug dealer and made over $600,000 in payments on a building and its renovation in
cash), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1053 (1993); Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841 (writing a check, whether for cash
or to a vendor for services provided falls within the definition of "financial transaction"); United
States v. Martin, 933 F.2d 609, 610 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257
(8th Cir. 1990) (transferring title of defendant's pickup truck found to constitute a "financial
transaction").
43. 9 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 1993).
44. Id. at 533-34.
45. Id. at 535.
46. Id.
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an entirely different question. In disposing of the matter, the Sixth Circuit did
not rely on whether the term "financial transaction" encompassed the
interstate transportation of illicit drug proceeds. Instead, the court focused
on the mens rea element of section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), which requires that the
defendant conduct a financial transaction knowing that it was designed to
conceal the nature or source of the proceeds. 7 Finding the evidence insufficient to support the requisite intent to conceal or disguise the nature or
source of the illicit proceeds, the court concluded that the government had
failed to establish a violation of either section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) or
(a)(1)(B)(i).

48

While the Samour court reached the right result, it misconstrued the
requisite elements of the statute. The court confused the "financial transaction" requirement with the scienter element, the latter of which requires that
the defendant have knowledge that the financial transaction was designed to
conceal the nature or source of the tainted proceeds. The "financial transaction" and scienter elements are separate statutory requirements, both of
which must be met to sustain a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Whether
the defendant engaged in a financial transaction is a separate issue from
whether he had knowledge that the financial transaction was designed to
conceal or disguise the nature or source of the proceeds.49
47. The Samour court cited with approval the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 1992). The Fifth Circuit, however, had held that
absent any evidence of intent to conceal or disguise the nature or source of the proceeds, transporting
$8,000 in cash in a public airport was not a violation of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
48. Samour, 9 F.3d at 535-36. Circuit Judge Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion, stating that he
would have affirmed the 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) conviction. While agreeing with the majority
that mere transportation of cash is not a financial transaction, Judge Kennedy observed that the facts
of the case established more than the mere transportation of cash. The funds in Samour were used to
purchase marijuana. The purchase constituted a "transaction" as defined in subsection (c)(3) and a
"financial transaction" (a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign
commerce) under subsection (c)(4). Judge Kennedy would have followed the Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1991), which affirmed a conviction for
money laundering based upon the mailing of money orders to purchase drugs. Samour, 9 F.3d at
538-39.
49. The Sixth Circuit in Samour advanced a second argument to support its conclusion. The court
observed that Congress addressed the mere transportation of funds in § 1956 (a)(2), the international
money laundering provision. The Sixth Circuit expressed its reluctance to conclude that a physical
transportation of money constitutes a "financial transaction" within the meaning of § 1956(a)(1),
because Congress specifically created a separate subsection for mere transportation of funds. Samour,
9 F.3d at 536.
A similar argument was rejected by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046,
1051 (5th Cir. 1991). In Hamilton, the defendant argued that his conviction for money laundering
should be reversed because if § 1956(a)(1) is construed to prohibit all mailings of drug proceeds, then
§ 1956(a)(2) adds nothing. Hamilton argued that he was charged under the wrong statute, and that
the mere act of mailing proceeds is covered by § 1956(a)(2), rather than § 1956(a)(1). Id. at 1051. The
Fifth Circuit dismissed Hamilton's interpretation of the two subsections of the statute. The court
emphasized that unlike § 1956(a)(1), "section 1956(a)(2) reaches beyond individual drug transactions
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In support of its conclusion that the transportation of currency does not
constitute a "financial transaction," the Sixth Circuit cited with approval
United States v. Bell"° and United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez.51 The court's
reliance on these cases is misplaced.
In Bell, the Seventh Circuit held that placing money in a safe deposit box
cannot be considered a "banking transaction" under the statute. 52 In response to the Bell decision, Congress amended the definition of "transaction" in section 1956(c)(3) to specifically proscribe "use of a safe deposit
box." 53 Thus, the Bell decision is clearly inapplicable to Samour.
In Gonzalez-Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit overturned a money laundering
conviction based upon insufficient evidence of a design to conceal the nature
and source of the drug proceeds. 54 Gonzalez-Rodriguez was decided solely on
the basis of this mens rea concealment issue. In fact, the court indicated that
the defendant's possession of $8,000 cash in the Houston airport was
sufficient to prove a financial transaction.55
Unlike the Sixth Circuit in Samour, the Second Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion on the financial transaction issue where the defendant
mailed the proceeds of narcotics trafficking as payment for drugs. In United
States v. Skinner, the defendant received quantities of cocaine in Vermont
from her source of supply in Alaska via Express Mail. 56 Skinner then sold the
cocaine to buyers in Vermont. To pay her supplier for the cocaine, Skinner
used the proceeds of the cocaine sales to purchase U.S. Postal Service money
orders which she sent to her cocaine supplier in Alaska.57 In affirming
Skinner's conviction for money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the court declared that "the words of this provision of the
statute, in conjunction with the definitions provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)
[which defines "financial transaction"58 ], demonstrate that Congress into facilitate
tended to make unlawful a broad array of transactions ' designed
59
cocaine.
of
sale
the
including
crimes,
federal
numerous
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit has reached inconsistent results in applying
the term "financial transaction." In United States v. Hamilton, the defendant
and encompasses the international transportation of 'monetary instruments or funds' that would
contribute to the growth and capitalization of the drug trade or other unlawful activities." Id.
50. 936 F.2d 337, 341-42 (7th Cir. 1991).
51. 966 F.2d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 1992).
52. 936 F.2d at 341.
53. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(3) (as amended 1992).
54. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d at 926 ("In the absence of evidence that [defendant] endeavored
to conceal or disguise, her conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) must be reversed.").
55. Id. at 924.
56. Skinner, 946 F.2d at 177.
57. Id.
58. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining, interalia,the term "financial transaction").
59. Skinner, 946 F.2d at 178.
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was convicted under section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) for attempting to mail $18,100,
which constituted the proceeds of drug trafficking, from Mississippi to
California. 60 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that mailing
the proceeds of drug sales is a financial transaction clearly prohibited under
the statute. 6 1 The Fifth Circuit declared that "the terms of the statute
prohibit mailing the proceeds of drug sales, and absent a clearly expressed
legislative intent to the contrary, that language must be regarded as conclusive .... 62
In United States v. Gallo63 the Fifth Circuit reached a similar result. While
not directly addressing whether the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the
"transaction" requirement under the statute, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
conviction of defendant Gallo for aiding and abetting a violation of section
1956(a)(1) involving the transportation in his automobile of $299,985 in
narcotics proceeds. 64 The Gallo decision subsequently has been cited by the
Fifth Circuit for the proposition that transporting money in the trunk of a car
60. Hamilton, 931 F.2d at 1048.
61. Id. at 1051. The Fifth Circuit also rejected appellant's argument that the mailing of drug
proceeds is not covered by section 1956(a)(1), but is exclusively covered by section 1956(a)(2), which
prohibits the transfer or transportation of the proceeds of drug sales across U.S. borders. Id. at
1051-52. While acknowledging that there may be some overlap, the court reasoned that "the two
subsections were passed to address two completely different problems." Id. at 1052. The Fifth Circuit
emphasized that a person could, in effect, violate section 1956(a)(2) without actually participating in
an unlawful transaction as defined by section 1956(a)(1).
The court set forth the following hypothetical to illustrate its point: A foreign drug cartel might
transfer proceeds from a legitimate business enterprise into a bank account in the United States.
Because the proceeds do not represent "proceeds of unlawful activities," the transfer of funds would
not violate section 1956(a)(1). Under section 1956(a)(2), however, the same transfer would be
prohibited if the legitimate proceeds of that bank account were intended to provide the funds
necessary to expand the drug enterprise. The Hamilton court declared, "[u]nlike section 1956(a)(1),
section 1956(a)(2) reaches beyond individual drug transactions and encompasses the international
transportation of 'monetary instruments or funds' that would contribute to the growth and capitalization of the drug trade or other unlawful activities." Id.
62. Id. at 1051.
63. 927 F.2d. 815 (5th Cir. 1991).
64. Id. at 822. The court in Gallo addressed two issues: whether the evidence showed that the
defendant had knowledge that the funds in his possession were drug proceeds, and whether the
transfer of currency in his car "had any discernible impact on interstate commerce." Id. at 822-23. On
the issue of knowledge, the court found the jury could reasonably infer that Gallo knew that he was
transporting the proceeds of unlawful activity from the following: 1) Gallo had just accepted delivery
of a box that contained $299,985 from Cruz, a suspected drug dealer; 2) fingerprints on the box
matched those of Balcazar, another known drug dealer; 3) Gallo made two false exculpatory
statements to law enforcement officers about the car and the box; and 4) Cruz and Balcazar had made
a similar exchange on the same day, Cruz tendering $300,000 cash to Balcazar in exchange for
twenty-five kilograms of cocaine. Id. at 822.
The Fifth Circuit has correctly ruled that the mere possession of drug proceeds does not constitute
a "financial transaction." See United States v. Ramirez, 954 F.2d 1035, 1040 (5th Cir.) (money found
by agents secreted in a shoe box in a closet of a house did not support an inference that defendant
"transferred, delivered, moved, or otherwise disposed of the money"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3010
(1992).
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65
constitutes a "financial transaction.
In United States v. Puig-Infante,66 the Fifth Circuit again squarely confronted the issue of whether the transportation of illicit proceeds constitutes
a "financial transaction." 67 This time, however, that court reached the
opposite conclusion. In Puig-Infante, the defendant Abigail Puig was convicted of violating section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) for transporting $47,000 from
Florida to Texas.68 The money was received in exchange for a load of
marijuana. The Fifth Circuit reversed the money laundering conviction,69
reasoning that the mere transportation of the proceeds of unlawful activity by
the defendant did not constitute a "financial transaction" within the meaning
the statute.70
In an attempt to reconcile its ruling in Puig-Infante with its earlier
decisions, the court reasoned that Gallo and Hamilton involved the "disposition" of the proceeds of unlawful activity. 7 ' The Fifth Circuit defined
"disposition" as "placing elsewhere, a giving over to the care or possession of
another.,72 In Gallo, the proceeds of a drug sale were transferred to the
defendant.73 In Hamilton, the defendant attempted to deliver the proceeds of
drug activity to Perez by placing them in the mail.7 4 In both cases the court
concluded that the defendants had disposed of narcotics proceeds.
In Puig-Infante, the court reasoned that since there was no evidence that
the defendant, after returning to Texas with the money, had given the
proceeds of the sale to the source of the marijuana, the transportation of the
drug money did not constitute a "disposition" under the statute.75
The attempt by the Fifth Circuit in Puig-Infante to distinguish Gallo and
Hamilton on this basis is tenuous and unpersuasive at best. First, it is difficult
to understand why Gallo's receipt of drug proceeds from the drug dealer

65. See United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331, 338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 597 (1992).

In United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1992), another transportation of
drug proceeds case, the Fifth Circuit side-stepped the financial transaction issue and reversed the
money laundering conviction on other grounds. The defendant was arrested at the Houston airport in
possession of $8,000 cash which represented the proceeds of drug activity. Id. at 923. While briefly
discussing the meaning of the statutory term "transaction," the Fifth Circuit reversed the money
laundering conviction, stressing that the government failed to introduce any evidence that the
possession or transportation of the drug money was "designed to conceal or disguise the nature, the
location, the course, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity," an
essential element for finding a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Id. at 925.
66. 19 F.3d 929 (5th Cir. 1994).

67. Id. at
68. Id.
69. Id. at
70. Id. at
71. Id. at

937-38.
950.
938.
939.

72. Id. at 938.

73. Id. at 939.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 938-39.
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constitutes the "disposition" of proceeds of unlawful activity, but Abigail
Puig's receipt of drug proceeds from the drug buyers does not. Likewise,
distinguishing criminal culpability based upon whether the defendant attempted to pay the drug supplier by depositing drug proceeds in the mail
(affirming Hamilton's money laundering conviction), or knowingly transported drug proceeds in an attempt to deliver them to the drug supplier
(reversing Puig-Infante's money laundering conviction) simply does not
make sense. The defendants are equally culpable in both cases.
The Samour and Puig-Infante rulings are also at odds with the plain
language of the statute. Section 1956(c)(3) defines the term "transaction" to
include a "delivery," "purchase," or "sale." A "financial transaction" includes "a transaction which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign
commerce (i) involving the movement of funds by wire or other means.... "
The transportation of funds in Samour and Puig-Infante involved the "sale"
and "purchase" of drugs as well as the "delivery" of illicit proceeds.76
This position was adopted by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Dimeck.77
In Dimeck, Pruneda was shipping marijuana into the Detroit area for
distribution. In an effort to collect the proceeds for the distribution of the
marijuana in Detroit, Pruneda asked Moore, a government informant, to
pick up a package containing $60,000 in drug proceeds and deliver the money
to Pruneda in California.78 Dimeck delivered the box containing $60,000 to
Moore, who in turn gave the money to the DEA.7 9 Dimeck was subsequently
convicted of conspiracy to violate section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 80
While agreeing with the result reached in Samour, the Dimeck court
expressly rejected the Sixth Circuit's reasoning. The Tenth Circuit found that
the movement of drug proceeds constitutes a transaction as defined by
section 1956(c)(3). The court declared:
Subsection 1956(c)(3) defines "transaction" to include "delivery" of the
illegal proceeds. A "financial transaction" includes "a transaction which
in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce (i) involving
the movement of funds by wire or other means or (ii) involving one or more
monetary instruments."81
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Dimeck moved funds by "other means"
when he delivered the funds to Moore. 2
The Tenth Circuit, however, found no evidence of a design by Dimeck to
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(3) and (4).
24 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1242.
Id. at 1243.
Id. at 1241.
Id. at 1246 (quoting § 1956(c)(4)) (emphasis in original).
Id.
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conceal or disguise the nature or source of the drug proceeds. The court
observed that the legislative intent was to punish those drug dealers who
thereafter take the additional step of attempting to legitimize their proceeds
in order to make it appear that the money was derived from a lawful
enterprise. Finding that additional step missing under the facts in Dimeck,
the court accordingly reversed the money laundering conviction.83
III. SECTION 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)-THE CONCEALMENT PROVISION

A. Knowledge that the Property Represents Proceeds of Unlawful Activity
To sustain a conviction under either section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) or (a)(1)(B)(i),
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
engaged in a financial transaction knowing that the funds represented, in
whole or in part, the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity.8 4 The
knowledge requirement may be proven by circumstantial evidence.85 The
circuits, however, disagree over whether proof that a drug dealer has no
legitimate source of income to account for large purchases amounts to
sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the money constitutes drug
proceeds.8 6 Mere suspicion that the proceeds were derived from unlawful
83. Id. at 1247. Relying on its earlier decision in United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1214
(10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3037 (1992), the Tenth Circuit stated that the money
laundering violation must "follow in time" the completion of the underlying transaction. For
purposes of the money laundering statute, the court concluded that "the underlying drug transaction
had not yet been completed and the money laundering activity had not yet begun." Dimeck, 24 F.3d at
1246.
84. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1); see also United States v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1994); United
States v. McDougald, 990 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1331 (1993); United States v. Long, 977 F.2d 1264, 1269-70 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 840 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Isabel, 945 F.2d
1193, 1202 (11th Cir. 1991).
85. See United States v. Brown, 944 F.2d 1377, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1991) (evidence that all of the
transactions were structured by defendant Hollenback to avoid reporting requirements associated
with transactions of $10,000 or more, coupled with evidence that Brown was dealing in drugs,
established by circumstantial evidence that defendant knew money constituted drug proceeds);
United States v. Blackman, 904 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1990) (evidence that Blackman wire
transferred $11,000 by Western Union, coupled with expert testimony that drug dealers frequently
use wire services in furtherance of drug activities and prefer to drive automobiles which are
encumbered by a lien to avoid police seizure, held sufficient to sustain conviction). But see McDougald,
990 F.2d at 261. In McDougald, with Circuit Judge Boggs dissenting, the Sixth Circuit found the
evidence insufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant had knowledge that $10,000 used to
purchase a Chevy Beretta for McFadden, a major drug dealer, constituted drug proceeds. The
evidence relied upon by the government included: (1) McFadden and associate Watts were drug
dealers; (2) McDougald spent time with McFadden and Watts; (3) McDougald acquiesced in the
suspicious acquisition of the vehicle; and (4) McDougald lied about the transaction to the police.
86. See United States v. Webster, 960 F.2d 1301, 1308 (5th Cir.) ("Evidence of a differential
between legitimate income and cash outflow is sufficient for a money-laundering conviction, even
when the defendant claims income from additional sources."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 355 (1992);
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activity is not enough. The statute requires a "knowing" state of mind, as
opposed to mere recklessness or negligence.87 The circuits, however, have
sustained money laundering convictions based on wilful blindness or conscious avoidance.
In United States v. Antzoulatos, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a money
laundering conviction against Antzoulatos, a used car dealer who sold cars to
alleged cocaine dealers.88 While Antzoulatos denied actual knowledge and
conceded only that he was guilty of negligence (i.e., he "should have known"
that the customers listed in the indictment were cocaine dealers), the
evidence established that Antzoulatos was closely linked to the drug dealers
with whom he dealt.89 In rejecting Antzoulatos' negligence defense to the
money laundering charge, the Seventh Circuit declared: "It is well settled
that wilful blindness or conscious avoidance is the legal equivalent to
knowledge." 90
The Fourth Circuit is in accord. In United States v. Campbell, the district
court granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal after the jury
returned a guilty verdict on two counts of money laundering. 91 The money
laundering counts involved the sale of a house by Campbell, a licensed real
estate agent, to Lawing, a drug dealer. Unable to secure a loan for $182,500,
the sale price for the residence, Lawing asked Campbell to relay to the sellers
whether they would accept $60,000 in cash under the table and thereafter
reduce the contract price to $122,500. The sellers agreed and Campbell
directly participated in the transaction.92 The Fourth Circuit reversed the
judgment of acquittal.93
The court in Campbell observed that, while the statute requires actual
subjective knowledge, this requirement is "softened somewhat by the doc-

Jackson, 935 F.2d at 839-41 (one factor jury is entitled to consider is whether defendant made bank
deposits exceeding amount that could reasonably be accounted for out of legitimate sources of
income); cf. Blackman, 904 F.2d at 1257 ("[T]he government cannot rely exclusively on proof that a
defendant charged with using proceeds from an unlawful activity has no legitimate source of
income.") (emphasis in original).
87. See United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479, 484 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Section 1956(a)(1) requires the
Government to prove that the defendant had 'actual subjective knowledge' that the money used in a
money laundering transaction was derived from an unlawful source."); United States v. Antzoulatos,
962 F.2d 720, 725 n.3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 331 (1992): United States v. Lora, 895 F.2d 878,
880 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990).
88. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d at 720-21.
89. Id. at 727. Antzoulatos mistitled cars for his drug-dealing customers and seveial of the
customers were prepared to testify at trial that they told Antzoulatos that they were drug dealers and
needed to conceal their drug profits.
90. Id. at 724.
91. United States v. Campbell, 977 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1331 (1993).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 859.
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trine of wilful blindness."9 4 After examining evidence introduced at trial of
Lawing's lavish lifestyle, testimony concerning Campbell's statement that the
money "might have been drug money," and the fraudulent transaction in
which Campbell was asked to participate, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Campbell was wilfully
blind to the fact that the $60,000 was drug profit and "deliberately closed her
eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to her."95
Finally, the Eighth Circuit has ruled that a wilful blindness instruction is
but the
appropriate when the defendant asserts "a lack of guilty knowledge,"
' 96
ignorance.
deliberate
of
inference
an
evidence "support[s]
The circuits have consistently held, and the statute is sufficiently clear, that
the government need not trace the proceeds to a particular drug transaction
or specified unlawful activity.9 7 The government need only show that "the
property involved in the transaction represented proceeds from some form,
though not necessarily which form, of [specified unlawful] activity." 98
B. Knowledge of the LaunderingDesign
To sustain a conviction for a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the
government must prove a second scienter element. The evidence must
establish that the defendant had knowledge that the transaction was "designed in whole or in part" to conceal or disguise the proceeds of specified
unlawful activity.99 The express terms of the statute provide that a design to
conceal or disguise the source or nature of the proceeds is a necessary
element to support a money laundering conviction.
94. Id. at 857. This view seems to be at odds with the Fourth Circuit's most recent pronouncement.
"Section 1956(a)(1) requires the Government to prove that the defendant had 'actual subjective
knowledge' that the money used in a money laundering transaction was derived from an unlawful
source. The defendant may not be convicted on just what he should have known." Heaps, 39 F.3d at
484 (citations omitted).
95. Campbell, 977 F.2d at 859.
96. Long, 977 F.2d at 1271 (quotations omitted).
97. See Car', 25 F.3d at 1205; Campbell, 977 F.2d at 858; United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 570
(10th Cir. 1992) ("Such an interpretation would allow individuals to avoid prosecution simply by
commingling legitimate funds with proceeds of crime."); Jackson, 935 F.2d at 840; Blackman, 904 F.2d
at 1257 ("We do not read the statute to require that the government trace the proceeds to aparticular
sale.") (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting
defendant's argument that the government must prove that all the money used in the transaction
came specifically from drug proceeds, not from untainted funds commingled in a Swiss bank account).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(1); see also Car', 25 F.3d at 1204 n.4 (" '[T]he defendant need not know
exactly what crime generated the funds involved in a transaction, only that the funds are the proceeds
of some kind of crime that is a felony under Federal or State law.' ") (quoting S. REP. No. 433, supra
note 5, at 12).
99. See United States v. Sutera, 933 F.2d 641, 648 (8th Cir. 1991) (jury need only find that
defendant intended to launder money, not that he "did a good job of laundering the proceeds").
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The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Sanders correctly observed that "the
purpose of the money laundering statute is to reach commercial transactions
intended (at least in part) to disguise the relationship of the item purchased
with the person providing the proceeds and that the proceeds used to make
the purchase were obtained from illegal activities. '0 At the same time, the
money laundering statute is not aimed solely at transactions intended to
disguise the identity of the participants in the transaction.
In an attempt to clarify the court's earlier ruling in Sanders, the Tenth
Circuit in United States v. Lovett held: "[T]he statute is aimed broadly at
transactions designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise in any manner
the nature, location, source, ownership or control of the proceeds of unlawful
activity." ' ' The court in Lovett affirmed the conviction on two money
laundering counts, finding that the transactions were designed to conceal the
illegal source of the proceeds (not the identity of the participants).1"2
The courts, however, have rejected construing the money laundering
statute so broadly as to encompass all transactions which involve the proceeds of unlawful activity. In United States v. Sanders, the defendant openly
purchased two automobiles with proceeds from drug transactions."' The
only evidence offered by the government to prove the design of concealment
was that the title to one vehicle was placed in the name of the defendant's
daughter, and a large amount of cash was used to purchase the two vehicles."0 4 In reversing the money laundering convictions, the court emphasized that merely spending the proceeds of illegal activities does not violate
the money laundering statute. The Tenth Circuit declared that "[t]o so
interpret the statute would ... turn the money laundering statute into a
'money spending statute.' ,105 To interpret the statute as a "money spending
statute" would run contrary to Congress's expressly stated intent that the
transactions being criminalized are those transactions "designed to conceal
ownership or the control
or disguise the nature, the location, the source,' 0 the
6
of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.'
The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Garcia-Emanuelelaborated on the
100. United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 946 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 142 (1991).
101. United States v. Lovett, 964 F.2d 1029, 1034 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 169 (1992)
(emphasis in original).
102. Id. at 1033-36; see also Sutera, 933 F.2d at 648 ("[T]he money laundering statute does not
require the jury to find that Sutera did a good job of laundering the proceeds.").
103. 928 F.2d at 946-47.
104. Id. at 944-45.

105. Id. at 946; see also Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841-42 (explaining that "government must prove not
just that the defendant spent ill-gotten gains, but that the expenditures were designed to hide the
provenance of the funds involved").
106. Sanders, 928 F.2d at 946. The Sanders decision has been cited with approval in United States v.
Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d 1469, 1476 (10th Cir. 1994); Lovett, 964 F.2d at 1034; United States v.
Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1991).
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quantum of proof and type of evidence necessary to support a finding of
intent to conceal or disguise.10 7 The court emphasized that "[t]he requirement that the transaction be 'designed' to conceal ... requires more than a
trivial motivation to conceal," and must be based on substantial evidence, not
mere suspicion. 0 8 The court recounted a variety of types of evidence that
have been cited by the circuits as supportive of evidence of intent to conceal
or disguise. Convictions have been affirmed for violating section
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) based upon each of the following: statements by a defendant probative of an intent to conceal, 10 9 evidence of a defendant's "convoluted financial dealings" with his banks and in his business,"O transactions
shrouded in secrecy,"' transferring funds abroad via private telex, coupled
with evidence of defendant's involvement in narcotics sales,' 12 commingling
in one account legitimate business receipts with illegitimate receipts," 3
transferring title in the name of a third party to conceal the real owner," l 4 and
structuring bank deposits to avoid the currency transaction reporting requirements.11 5
The Tenth Circuit, however, has not consistently applied its own "substantial evidence" test. In United States v. Salcido, the Tenth Circuit, in a 2-1
decision, affirmed a conviction for money laundering under section
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) on far less than substantial evidence. 1 6 In Salcido, the
defendant was convicted of money laundering for proposing that the purported drug proceeds be converted into large bills that could more easily be

107. Garcia-Emanuel,14 F.3d at 1475-76.
108. Id. at 1474.
109. Id. at 1478 (defendant stated he intended to place assets in his wife's name to defraud the
IRS); United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir.) (unindicted co-conspirator testified that
money used to renovate nightclub was from drug trafficking and defendant instructed him to say that
money was gambling winnings), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 396 (1993).
110. See United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Peery, 977
F.2d 1230, 1234 (8th Cir. 1992) (defendant's withdrawing money from business bank account,
depositing it in his personal bank account in Atlanta, and then wire transferring money to personal
bank account in Lincoln, Nebraska, established requisite intent to conceal source of funds), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1354 (1993).
111. See United States v. Cota, 953 F.2d 753, 760-61 (2d Cir. 1992).
112. See United States v. Massac, 867 F.2d 174, 178 (3d Cir. 1989).
113. See United States v. Termini, 992 F.2d 879, 880 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Posters 'N
Things Ltd., 969 F.2d 652, 661 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. granted on other grounds, 113 S. Ct. 1410 (1993);
Jackson, 935 F.2d at 842; Sutera, 933 F.2d at 648.
114. See United States v. Santos, 20 F.3d 280 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Kaufman, 985 F.2d
884, 894 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2350 (1993); United States v. Turner, 975 F.2d 490, 496-97
(8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1053 (1993); Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1210-11; United States v.
Martin, 933 F.2d 609, 610 (8th Cir. 1991) ($15,000 stock purchase in cash and stock certificates issued
in third party's name, coupled with evidence that defendant was involved in discussions regarding
other possible investments for drug proceeds, found sufficient to support intent to conceal).
115. See Garcia-Emanuel,14 F.3d at 1478.
116. United States v. Salcido, 33 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 1994).
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transported.' 17 The majority posited that based upon this evidence, the jury
could reasonably infer that Salcido knew the "character" of the money he
was to transport and was attempting to conceal it. 8 Circuit Judge Kelly
authored a dissenting opinion stressing that Salcido's request for large bills
provided evidence only of his intention to conceal the fact that he was
carrying money. However, the mere physical concealment and transportation
of money is not what Congress contemplated as an offense under section
1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Absent evidence of his intent to conceal the character of
the money, the government failed to prove that the defendant violated
section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). 9
It follows from this line of cases that the exchange of money for drugs and
the mere transportation of drug proceeds, without more, is insufficient to
support a finding that the defendant engaged in a financial transaction with
the intent to conceal or disguise the nature or source of the illicit proceeds. In
enacting the MLCA, Congress was not simply concerned with criminalizing
the concealment of drug proceeds. Instead, its aim was to prohibit "the
conversion of cash into goods or services as a way of concealing or disguising
the wellspring of the cash."' 2 ° Absent evidence that the defendant took this
additional step to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, the government should refrain from charging the defendant under section
1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Moreover, every court that has considered the issue has
concluded that neither the payment of money for drugs nor the transportation of drug proceeds supports a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)."2 ,
IV. SECTION 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)-THE PROMOTION PROVISION
A. Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)-Domestic Money Laundering
Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) makes it a federal crime to conduct a financial
transaction involving the proceeds of unlawful activity "with the intent to
promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity."' 22 The statute is
aimed at "the practice of plowing back proceeds of 'specified unlawful
activity' to promote that activity."' 23 It differs from section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)
117. Id. at 1246.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1247 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
120. Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841; see United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1247 (10th Cir. 1994);
Garcia-Emanuel,14 F.3d at 1474; United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531, 535 (6th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d 918, 925 (5th Cir. 1992).
121. See Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1246; Samour, 9 F.3d at 536; Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d at 925-26.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (1988); see also United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d
Cir. 1993) (act of cashing embezzled checks "promoted" the fraud of embezzlement within the
meaning of the statute), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1076 (1994).
123. United States v. Jackson, 935 F.2d 832, 842 (7th Cir. 1991).
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in that intent to launder, disguise, or conceal the nature or source of the
proceeds is not an element of the offense.' 24 The requisite intent to promote
the carrying on of unlawful activity, however, cannot be inferred from the
mere use of illicit proceeds to pay personal expenses or purchase consumer
goods."
In United States v. Jackson, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a conviction on
one count of money laundering where drug proceeds were used to purchase
telephone paging beepers. The beepers were used to contact drug couriers
who were thereafter instructed on where to make drug money pickups.126
The Seventh Circuit found that the use of the beepers was an integral part of
the drug operation and that the use of the drug proceeds to purchase the
beepers was intended to promote the carrying on of criminal activity.' 27
The Seventh Circuit, however, reached a different conclusion with respect
to the use of funds derived from drug activities to pay rental fees and
purchase mobile car phones. While upholding the money laundering convictions under section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the court found the evidence insufficient to support a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The Jackson court
opined that the government failed to prove that the cellular phones played
any role in the drug operations, and while the rental payments helped
the defendant's personal lifestyle, the evidence failed to show how
maintain
this promoted his drug activities.128To sustain a conviction under section
1956(a)(1)(A)(i), the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the funds must be
"plowed back" to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity,
29
not simply used to benefit the defendant personally. 1
Two circuits have affirmed money laundering convictions for a violation of
section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) under the theory that payment of money in return
for the receipt of illegal drugs promoted the carrying on of specified unlawful
activity.' 3 ° Although the court's analysis is minimal, in United States v.
Hamilton the Fifth Circuit held that section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) "clearly prohibits the mailing of drug money." 131 In United States v. Skinner, the Second

124. See United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir. 1991) (clarifying that subsections
(A)(i) and (B)(i) are aimed at different activities); Jackson, 935 F.2d at 842 (same).
125. Paramo, 998 F.2d at 1217.
126. Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 842.
130. See United States v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1991) (noting that Congress intended the
statute to reach a broad array of activities designed to facilitate crimes); United States v. Hamilton,
931 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1991) (same); see also United States v. Samour, 9 F.3d 531, 538-39 (6th
Cir. 1993) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (following the reasoning of Second Circuit in United States v.
Skinner, court should have affirmed Samour's conviction under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)).
131. Hamilton, 931 F.2d at 1052 (affirming defendant's conviction under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) for attempting to
mail proceeds of drug trafficking from Mississippi to known drug trafficker in California).
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Circuit upheld the defendant's conviction on four counts of conducting a
financial transaction with the proceeds of unlawful activity in violation of
section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 132 Similar to the facts in Hamilton, Skinner mailed
the proceeds of narcotics trafficking to her source of supply via the mail. 33 In
affirming the money laundering convictions, the Second Circuit misconstrued
the intent of Congress when it posited that, in enacting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), Congress intended to make unlawful a broad array of
transactions "designed to facilitate numerous federal crimes, including the
distribution of cocaine.' 134
The Second Circuit erroneously read the statute as prohibiting financial
transactions that "facilitate" the commission of specified unlawful activity.
While the Skinner case was rightly decided, the Second Circuit's reasoning is
flawed. Skinner violated section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) not because the payments
she made to her supply source in Alaska facilitated the sale of cocaine, but
rather because Skinner plowed back proceeds of specified unlawful activity
to promote the carrying on of that activity. 135 Skinner took the proceeds from
drug trafficking and used those monies to purchase additional quantities of
cocaine, which in turn "promote[di the carrying on" of her narcotics distribution business.
Congress was concerned with stemming the flow of illicit profits back to the
criminal enterprise to be used to capitalize and expand criminal activity.' 36
The chief evil to be addressed by the legislation was not conduct that
facilitates specified unlawful activity. Prior to the enactment of the MLCA,
aiding and abetting or conspiring to violate those offenses enumerated under
the definition of "specified unlawful activity" was already punishable under
federal law.' 37 Congress's intent was not simply to add to the prosecutor's
arsenal another federal criminal statute to cover previously prohibited
conduct. Rather, its intent was to create a new federal crime to punish
activity that was not previously proscribed.' 38
The Tenth Circuit has construed the MLCA accordingly. In United States v.
Edgmon, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the legislative intent of the MLCA. The
court observed that in the Senate report to section 1956, Congress expressed
132. Skinner, 946 F.2d at 177.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 178.
135. See Jackson, 935 F.2d at 842.
136. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
137. For example, if a person aided and abetted the commission of a narcotics felony prior to the
enactment of the MLCA, the accessory could be charged as a principal for violating 21 U.S.C.
§ 941(a)(1) (1988). See 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) ("(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.").
138. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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the need for a federal criminal offense aimed at the activity of laundering
money derived from illegal activity.' 39 The discussion throughout the report
emphasized the need to fill a gap in the criminal law with respect to the
post-crime laundering of ill-gotten gain.1 n0 The court in Edgmon concluded that
the statute was intended to create a "new offense against money laundering."''
The Tenth Circuit posited that "Congress aimed the crime of money
laundering at conduct that follows in time the underlying crime rather than to
afford an alternative means of punishing the prior 'specified unlawful activity., ,142 In United States v.Dimeck, the Tenth Circuit again embraced
Edgmon's construction of the MLCA. The court found that absent the
additional step by the drug dealer of attempting to launder the money, the
delivery of drug proceeds by the middleman to the drug seller (or money
courier acting on his behalf) does not violate section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).143
While it should be noted that both Edgmon and Dimeck were section
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) cases, the reasoning of the court is just as compelling, and
the legislative history cited by the Tenth Circuit just as relevant, in construing
the scope of application of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). The statute should not
be applied to conduct that merely facilitates the commission of the underlying drug offense. Congress was aiming at the plowing back of proceeds of
specified unlawful activity to capitalize and finance that activity. Congress's
intent was to criminalize the use of illegal funds "to buy more drugs for
resale, and to acquire the planes, boats, and front corporations [used by drug
dealers] to smuggle drugs into the United States." 144 That does not mean to
say that the defendant is not chargeable with a federal crime, but rather that
he should be charged with something other than money laundering.
The Fourth Circuit's reading of the legislative intent in United States v.
Heaps145 is in accord. In Heaps, the defendant fronted quantities of illicit
drugs to two drug dealers, Beck and Boccia. Beck wired, via Western Union,
two money orders to the defendant's girlfriend, one in the amount of $1,500
and the other for $500.146 The funds that Beck and Boccia sent to the
defendant were proceeds from the sale of LSD to an undercover DEA
agent. 147 The only evidence of what was done with the money after it was wire

139. United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3037
(1992).
140. Id.

141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. (quoting from S. REP. No. 433, supra note 5, at 4).
Id. at 1214.
United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1247 (10th Cir. 1994).
See supra note 5 (statement of Senator Alfonse D'Amato, a chief sponsor of the Senate Bill).

145. United States v. Heaps, 39 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1994).
146. Id. at 481.
147. Id. at 482.
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transferred was that it was placed in a box in a drawer in Heaps's house. 148
counts of money
Heaps was indicted and subsequently convicted of two
14 9
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
The government predicated its argument that the transfer of the two
money orders totalling $2,000 was intended to promote the carrying on of
specified unlawful activity on two theories: first, that the transfers were made
to establish goodwill for the promotion of future sales of illicit drugs by the
defendant, and second, that the transfers completed the antecedent drug
sales.'5 0 The court quickly dispensed with the government's first argument.
The court found no evidence to support the allegation that the payment was
made to create goodwill for subsequent drug transactions.15' The Fourth
Circuit characterized the payment as being made merely to satisfy a debt
from a completed drug transaction, and not to encourage future drug
transactions. 152 In rejecting the government's second theory of promotion,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned:
Were the payment for drugs itself held to be a transaction that promoted
the unlawful activity of that same transaction virtually every sale of drugs
would be an automatic money laundering violation as soon as money
changed hands. Understood this way, § 1956 would have such reach that it
would criminalize the very same conduct already criminalized by the drug
laws. 153
The Heaps court concluded that Congress intended the money laundering
statute to create a separate crime, distinct from the offense that generated
the money to be laundered. The Fourth Circuit followed the rationale of the
Seventh Circuit in United States v. Jackson, holding that in the absence of any
evidence that the drug proceeds were plowed back into the drug enterprise,
the government failed to carry its burden of proving that the defendant
intended to promote the carrying on of unlawful activity within the meaning
of the statute. 54
A related question is whether a defendant can "promote the carrying on"
of an already completed unlawful activity. Stated another way, in order to
support a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), must the evidence show that
the proceeds of unlawful activity were plowed back into a continuing criminal

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

480.
484.

485-86 (emphasis in original).
486; see also Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841.
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1 56
55
scheme? This issue has been addressed by the Ninth,1 Third, and Fifth
Circuits. In United States v. Montoya, the defendant was a former California
state senator who had been charged with extortion and attempted extortion
under color of official right in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951,
and money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). 158 The
money laundering count alleged that Montoya deposited into his personal
checking account a $3,000 check he received from a fictitious FBI front
company, which was derived from the proceeds of a "specified unlawful
activity," namely, bribery.' 5 9
On appeal, Montoya argued that the check did not involve the proceeds of
an ongoing criminal venture and therefore did not "promote the carrying on
of specified unlawful activity." Furthermore, he asserted that depositing the
check could not have "promoted" the unlawful activity because the bribery
offense had been completed upon receipt of the check from the undercover
FBI agent.16 ° The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the
money laundering conviction, reasoning that Montoya could not have made
use of the funds without depositing the check. Additionally, the court
observed that depositing the check provided an opportunity for Montoya to
carry out the illegal bribery by characterizing the money as a legitimate
honorarium.' 6 '
The Ninth Circuit misconstrued the objective of the money laundering
statute. While no one would disagree with the court's reasoning that Montoya could not have made use of the funds without depositing or converting
the check, this is beside the point. The subsequent use of funds to benefit the
test. 162
defendant personally or enhance his lifestyle is not the relevant
Instead, the statute proscribes engaging in a financial transaction with
monies derived from unlawful activity with the intent to promote "the
carrying on" of specified unlawful activity. Had Montoya taken the check and
exchanged it for $3,000 in mobile car phones, or signed over the check to his
landlord as payment for rent (such as the drug proceeds in United States v.
Jackson), the Montoya court could not reasonably assert that the use of the
funds derived from the bribery offense promoted the carrying on of that
activity. It strains credulity to suggest that if the defendant used the $3,000

155. United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1075-77 (9th Cir. 1991).
156. United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 1212, 1216-18 (3d Cir. 1993).
157. United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 93 (5th Cir. 1994).
158. Montoya, 945 F.2d at 1070.
159. Both federal and state bribery offenses comprise "specified unlawful activity" under sections
1956(c)(7)(D) and 1956(c)(7)(A).
160. Montoya, 945 F.2d at 1076.
161. Id.
162. Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841.
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check to acquire material goods or pay personal expenses, he would escape
criminal liability (the facts in Jackson), but if, on the other hand, he merely
deposited the check in his personal checking account, he would be guilty of
federal money laundering.
In Montoya, the Ninth Circuit failed to explain adequately how depositing
the check promoted "the carrying on" of specified unlawful activity (here,
bribery) any more than using the funds to make rental payments or purchase
consumer goods for personal use. In neither Jackson nor Montoya did the
financial transactions contribute to the ongoing nature of the criminal
activity, or for that matter to the commission of the underlying offense.
Additionally, the issue of whether depositing the check assisted Montoya in
disguising the funds as a legitimate honorarium, while relevant to whether he
violated section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), has no bearing on whether the defendant
violated section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i). Neither intent to disguise, nor intent to
conceal the nature of the illicit proceeds, is an element of section
1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
63
The Third Circuit confronted a similar issue in United States v. Paramo.1
In Paramo, the defendant was convicted of mail fraud and five counts of
money laundering stemming from his participation in a scheme to embezzle
Internal Revenue Service tax refund checks. 164 Paramo challenged his money
laundering convictions on grounds of insufficiency of evidence, arguing that
the evidence failed to show that he plowed back any of the proceeds to
further the mail fraud scheme. The Third Circuit disagreed. The court
reasoned that, by definition, to "promote" something means to "contribute
to [its] growth . . . or prosperity. 1 65 The court posited that the embezzled
checks would have been worthless unless cashed at a bank or otherwise
exchanged for negotiable currency. The court declared that "cashing each
fraud
check contributed to the growth and prosperity of each preceding mail
66
by creating value out of an otherwise unremunerative enterprise." 1
The Third Circuit in Parano acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit in
Jackson found section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) to be aimed at the practice of plowing
back proceeds of unlawful activity to promote that activity. Yet the Third
Circuit asserted that nowhere did the Seventh Circuit suggest "an intention
either to delineate the universe of conduct prohibited under section
1956(a)(1)(A)(i) or to decide whether a defendant could violate that section
other than by plowing back the proceeds of unlawful activity."' 1 67 The Third
Circuit was reluctant to read Jackson as requiring evidence that the defen163. 998 F.2d 1212, 1218 (3d Cir. 1993).
164. Id. at 1214-15.

165. Id. at 1218.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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dant had plowed back or reinvested criminal proceeds to sustain a violation
of the statute.
The Third Circuit placed undue emphasis on the word "promote." It
apparently would read out of the statute the requirement that the financial
transaction not simply promote the specified unlawful activity, but promote
"the carrying on" of the specified unlawful activity. This construction of
section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) would render the statutory language to promote
"the carrying on" of enumerated criminal activity superfluous and meaningless. To sustain a violation of the money laundering statute, the Third Circuit
would simply require that the financial transaction promote the16specified
1
unlawful activity, i.e, "contribute to [its] growth.., or prosperity.'
Nevertheless, let us assume arguendo that section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) can be
violated by means other than plowing back the proceeds of unlawful activity.
Thus, while depositing the tax refund checks may have served to make the
unlawful scheme profitable and benefit the defendant personally by "creating
value out of an otherwise unremunerative enterprise," it is difficult to see
how this served in any way to "contribute to [the] growth ...or prosperity" of
the mail fraud scheme. 169 Moreover, cashing the tax refund checks was
certainly not integral to the success of carrying on the specified unlawful
activity, an element the Seventh Circuit had found necessary in Jackson. 7 '
In United States v. Cavalier,the Fifth Circuit reached a similar result as that
in Montoya and Paramo."7 ' In Cavalier,the defendant was convicted of mail
fraud and aiding and abetting money laundering as part of an insurance fraud
72
scheme in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 2(b).1
Cavalier shipped a van to Honduras, where he sold it for approximately
$10,000. He thereafter submitted a false theft report to Allstate Insurance
Corporation ("Allstate"), reporting the van stolen.1 73 Allstate subsequently
mailed a check to the General Motors Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC")
in the amount of over $9,700 to satisfy the lien on the vehicle. 74 Cavalier
challenged his money laundering conviction, arguing that Allstate's transfer
of the check to GMAC did not evince an intent to promote the carrying on of
mail fraud because the mail fraud offense was completed when he mailed the
false insurance theft report to Allstate. 175 The Fifth Circuit rejected this

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Jackson, 935 F.2d at 841.
171. United States v. Cavalier, 17 F.3d 90, 90 (5th Cir, 1994).
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1988) (providing that "[w]hoever willfully causes an act to be done which
if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as
a principal").
173. Cavalier, 17 F.3d at 91.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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argument, citing Montoya and Paramo.'7 6 While conceding that mailing the
false theft report completed the specified unlawful activity of mail fraud, the
Fifth Circuit posited that Allstate's transfer of a check to GMAC contributed
completed mail fraud by causing GMAC to extinguish
to and promoted the
17 7
van.
the
the lien on
Once again, the court erred in its application of the statute. Extinguishing
the lien on the van did not promote ongoing criminal activity and could not
have served to promote the mail fraud scheme which the court in Cavalier
conceded was completed by placing the false theft report in the mail. 178 At
most, mailing the check to GMAC "promote[d]" attainment of the object of
the scheme to defraud by relieving Cavalier of any financial obligation to
make payments on the van. While Cavalier may have personally benefitted by
GMAC extinguishing the lien, mailing the false theft report did not promote
"the carrying on" of the completed mail fraud scheme.
Finally, it should be noted that in United States v. Heaps, the Fourth Circuit
explicitly rejected the holdings of the Third and Ninth Circuits in Paramoand
Montoya.179 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit has aligned itself with the Seventh
Circuit in Jackson, requiring evidence that the defendant "plow[ed] back
proceeds of 'specified unlawful activity' to promote that activity."' 80 The
Fourth Circuit found Cavalier to be distinguishable in that the defendant in
Cavalier, through the act of mail fraud, induced the insurance company to
to the credit company to cause it to extinguish its lien against the
send a check
18 1
vehicle.
B. Section 1956(a) (2) (A)-IntemationalMoney Laundering
A similar issue arose in United States v. Piervinanzi, which involved a
scheme to fraudulently transfer funds overseas.182 Piervinanzi was charged
with attempted bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344 and 2, and
attempted money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2)(A) and
2.183 Section 1956(a)(2)(A) criminalizes international money laundering and
prohibits transporting or transferring money outside the United States with
18 4
the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Heaps, 39 F.3d at 486.
Id. (quoting Jackson, 935 F.2d at 842).
Id. at 485.
United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670 (2d Cir. 1994).
Id. at 674.
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) (1988) provides in relevant part:
(2) Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or
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Piervinanzi challenged his conviction for attempted money laundering arguing that section 1956(a)(2)(A) "proscribes only money 'laundering' activity
that is analytically distinct from the underlying criminal activity that it
promotes.) 185 The defendant maintained that because the asserted money
laundering activity (the overseas transfer of the bank funds) was a component of the bank fraud scheme, there was no analytically distinct "secondary"
activity.' 86 Under this rationale, the overseas transfer of funds "merges" with
the underlying bank fraud.18 7 The Second Circuit rejected this argument.
The court initially observed that section 1956(a)(1), the domestic money
laundering statute, requires that the financial transaction involve the proceeds of specified unlawful activity. By contrast, section 1956(a)(2), the
international money laundering provision, contains no requirement that the
funds transferred outside the United States constitute illicit proceeds.' 88 The
court found what it termed a "clearly demarcated two-step requirement"
necessary to find a violation of section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).' 89 This requires,
first, that the proceeds be derived from specified unlawful activity and,
second, that the defendant, knowing the funds are tainted, conduct a
financial transaction with the illicit proceeds with the intent to promote
specified unlawful activity. In contrast, the court concluded, section 1956(a)(2)
"contains no requirement that the 'proceeds' first be generated by unlawful
activity, followed by a financial transaction with those proceeds, for criminal
liability to attach."'1 90 Therefore, the international laundering activity proscribed in section 1956(a)(2) need not involve separately derived criminal
proceeds.
The Fifth Circuit embraced a similar construction of section 1956(a)(2) in
United States v. Hamilton.' 9' The court asserted that a person could violate
section 1956(a)(2) without participating in a financial transaction as defined
by section 1956(a)(1). The Hamilton court explained that if a foreign drug
cartel transferred proceeds from a legitimate business enterprise into a bank
in the United States, the transfer would not violate the domestic money
laundering statute because the funds would not represent the "proceeds of
transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a place in the United States to or through
a place outside the United States...
(A) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, ..
or imprisonment for not more than twenty years,
shall be sentenced to a fine
or both.
See S. REP. No. 433, supra note 5, at 11; see also Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d at 680.
185. Piervinanzi,23 F.3d at 679.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 680.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046, 1052 (5th Cir. 1991).
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unlawful activities., 192 The same transfer, however, would be criminalized
the
under section 1956(a)(2) if the proceeds were intended to provide
193
States.
United
the
in
enterprise
drug
the
expand
to
capital
necessary
While the Second Circuit in Piervinanzi correctly ruled that section
1956(a)(2) does not require that the funds attempted to be transferred
overseas be derived from specified criminal activity, the funds must nevertheless be transferred with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified
unlawful activity. On this point, the Piervinanzi court incorrectly read the
statute as simply requiring that the international transfer of funds "promote"
or facilitate the commission of the underlying crime. The Second Circuit
declared: "Because transferring the funds overseas ... was integral to the

success of both fraudulent schemes, it is undeniable that the attempted
transfers were designed to 'promote' the underlying crime of bank fraud."19' 4
Whether the transfer of the funds was integral to the perpetration of the
underlying offense presents an entirely different question from whether the
international transfer of funds promoted the carrying on of criminal activity.
The relevant inquiry is whether the monies were intended to be invested in
the specified criminal activity to sustain or expand that activity. 195 This
certainly suggests conduct separate and distinct from the underlying specified unlawful activity.
The Second Circuit also dismissed Piervinanzi's argument that the requirement that the funds promote the "carrying on" of unlawful activity connotes
continuous criminal activity. The reasoning of the court is even less persuasive on this point. The Second Circuit reasoned that the "specified unlawful
activity" that must be "carried on" to support a violation of the statute is
defined in section 1956(c)(7) as statutorily proscribed singular offenses
including, for example, "any act or activity constituting an offense." Thus, a
can be satisfied by the "carrying on" of a single
violation of section 1956(a)(2)
196
fraud.
bank
of
offense
The Second Circuit's constrained reading of the statute is vulnerable on
two grounds. First, the fact that the enumerated crimes which constitute
"specified unlawful activity" are described in section 1956(c)(7) in singular
terms begs the question. The critical inquiry is not the number of enumerated
crimes violated. In order to sustain a conviction for international money
laundering, the government is not required to prove that the defendant
transferred funds to promote the carrying on of a "series" or "pattern" of
statutorily enumerated criminal offenses. The international money launder192. Id.
193. Id.

194. Piervinanzi,23 F.3d at 679.
195. Jackson, 935 F.2d at 842.
196. Piervinanzi,23 F.3d at 680.
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ing statute is violated if the defendant transfers money across U.S. borders
with the intent to capitalize or expand a criminal enterprise, regardless of
whether the enterprise was engaged in the commission of a single offense
(e.g., narcotics trafficking) or multiple offenses (e.g., narcotics trafficking,
extortion, and bank fraud) defined as "specified unlawful activity" under the
statute.
Second, as previously stated, Congress's primary concern in enacting
federal legislation was the spiraling growth of money laundering and the
reinvestment of illicit profits to expand the operation of organized crime and
narcotics trafficking in the United States.1 97 The facts in Piervinanzi establish
nothing more than that the attempted transfer of the funds was intended to
facilitate the commission of the underlying offense. The legislative intent of
the statute is clearly at odds with the Second Circuit's application of the
money laundering statute. The requirement that the transfer of funds
promote the "carrying on" of the specified unlawful activity, and that the
money be plowed back to capitalize that activity, rather than merely contribute in some general way to the object of the completed crime, is simply not
satisfied in Piervinanzi.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 is a potent weapon in the war
against traditional organized crime and international narcotics trafficking.
The MLCA strikes at the economic base and lifeblood of organized crime, a
critical component of any government strategy intended to wage a successful
assault on sophisticated criminal enterprises.198 At the same time, in legislating the MLCA, Congress had a very specific purpose in mind and federal
prosecutors as well as the courts should be cautious not to extend its
application beyond that expressed purpose. Congress intended to fill a
critical gap in the criminal law with respect to the post-crime hiding and
reinvesting of illicit profits to continue proscribed criminal activity. 99 It was
Congress's intent to add a new criminal offense to punish activity not
previously punished criminally.200 Moreover, "Congress aimed the crime of
money laundering at conduct that follows in time the underlying crime rather
than to afford an alternative means of punishing the prior 'specified unlawful

197. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
199. See United States v. Edgmon, 952 F.2d 1206, 1213 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that the Senate
discussed a gap in the criminal law and intended to create a new offense), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 3037
(1992); United States v. Dimeck, 24 F.3d 1239, 1246-47 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the statute was
designed to punish those who attempt to legitimize drug proceeds).
200. See Edgmon, 952 F.2d at 1213-14 (Congress intended to add a new offense).
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activity.' ,,2Ol This legislative intent must be kept in mind in order to properly
apply the statute.
Despite the current split of authority, paying for drugs with the proceeds of
drug sales constitutes a "sale" or "purchase" under the definition of "transaction" as defined in section 1956(c)(3). 2 Furthermore, the sale or purchase
of illicit drugs is a "financial transaction," as defined in section 1956(c)(4), if
the transaction involves the movement of funds by wire or by other means
which in any way affects interstate or foreign commerce.2 °3 Likewise, the
"delivery" or "transfer" of the proceeds of narcotics trafficking is a "transaction" under the statute. It is a "financial transaction" if it involves the
movement of funds by wire or by other means which in any way affects
interstate or foreign commerce.7 °
Nevertheless, the payment for drugs with proceeds from narcotics trafficking violates section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) only if the proceeds are plowed back to
continue that activity (i.e., to promote the carrying on of the narcotics
distribution business). Section 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) does not proscribe participation in a financial transaction where the intent is simply to promote or
facilitate the completion of the underlying criminal offense.
At the same time, neither the payment of money for drugs nor the receipt
and transportation of currency derived from drug trafficking is prohibited
conduct under section 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Absent evidence that the defendant
intended to legitimize the proceeds to make it appear that the money was
derived from a legal enterprise, a conviction under this section cannot be
sustained.20 5 Federal prosecutors should refrain from filing money laundering charges under this section of the MLCA.
In any event, federal courts can avoid disparate and inconsistent application of the MLCA by simply adhering to the drafters' intent.

201. Id. at 1214.
202. See United States v. Skinner, 946 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that MLCA conviction

was proper when defendant used cocaine sale proceeds to buy money orders and mailed them to
co-defendant); United States v. Hamilton, 931 F.2d 1046, 1051 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the terms
of the statute prohibit mailing the proceeds of drug sales).
203. See Hamilton, 931 F.2d at 1051.
204. See Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1246 (holding that the movement of drug proceeds can constitute a
transaction); Skinner, 946 F.2d at 178 (same).
205. See Dimeck, 24 F.3d at 1247 (defendant must attempt to legitimize proceeds so that observers
believe that money is derived from a legal enterprise); United States v. Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d
1469, 1474 (10th Cir. 1994) (it is difficult to find money laundering when defendant acquires an asset
to bring him personal benefit); United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d 918, 925 (5th Cir. 1992)
(in order to find a violation of MLCA, government must show that defendant tried to disguise nature,
source, or ownership of funds).

